The "types of proof" and their applicability in philosophy constitute a fundamental debate, particularly within Transcendent Philosophy. This paper critically analyzes Allameh Tabataba'i's restriction of philosophical proof to inni (a posteriori) proof via general concomitances, alongside its critiques by contemporary commentators. Relying on the principle "that which possesses a cause is known only through its cause" and the definition of philosophy's subject matter, Allameh deems both inni proof based on specific concomitance and limmi (a priori) proof impossible in resolving philosophical problems. He argues that proceeding from effect to cause fails to yield certitude, and "existence qua existence" lacks an external cause. Conversely, critics assert that inni proof yields certitude, citing the conflation between the realms of assertion (ithbat) and reality (thubut), or proposing inni proof via knowledge by presence. Furthermore, through frameworks like "conceptual-analytical causality," "inter-level existential causality," "the reduction of general concomitances to limmi proof," and its application in theology proper—while accepting "narrower essential accidents"—they attempt to validate limmi proof in philosophy. Through a critical analysis, this study demonstrates that these critiques either misinterpret Allameh's thesis or rely on foundational premises he rejects, rendering them foundational disagreements. Ultimately, Allameh Tabataba'i’s position is defended as a highly coherent reading firmly grounded in authentic philosophical principles